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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Two Jim, Inc. ("Two Jinn") appeals from the district court's order affirming 
the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond 
("Motion to Exonerate Bond.") 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
With the following minor exceptions, the State of Idaho agrees with Two Jinn's statement 
of the General Course of Proceedings. Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), pgs. 
1-3. The State disagrees with Two Jim's assertion that it "lacked any legal recourse to return 
Mr. Harris to Idaho involuntarily." Id. at 2. The State additionally notes that the hearing before 
the magistrate on Two Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond was held on October 31, 2008, rather 
than October 11, 2008. Appellant's Brief, pg. 3; Tr. (10131/08);' R. 140-42. 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the magistrate abuse his discretion in denying Two Jim's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond by determining that justice did not require exoneration of the bond? 
B. Did the magistrate abuse his discretion in denying Two Jim's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond by determining that the doctrine of impossibility did not require exoneration of 
the bond? 
' The transcript of the October 3 1,2008 hearing is an exhibit to the record in this case, 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate appropri~tely exercised his discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond, and t'he district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's well-reasoned decision 
on intermediate appeal. As discussed in detail below, the magistrate was within the bounds of 
his discretion in concluding that justice did not require exoneration of the bail bond at issue in 
this case and that the doctrine of impossibility did not warrant exoneration of the bond. 
Accordingly, the State of Idaho respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order upholding the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond. 
B. Standard of Review 
This Court recently articulated the applicable standard of review as follows: 
"On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its 
intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's 
decision." In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009). However, to 
determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, the Court independently 
examineis] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." State v. DeWitt, 145 
Idaho 709, 71 1, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). "If those findings are so 
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed 
the magistrate's decision, we [will] affirm the district court's decision as a matter 
of procedure." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 
(2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 
(1 98 1 ) ) .  
C m m ~  v. Bromlev, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 3415745, "1 (Idaho 2009); see also Montgomery v. 
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009) ("When this Court reviews a decision 
rendered by a district court acting in its appellate capacity, it considers the trial court's 
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[magistrate's] decision, and if that decision is free from error and if the district court affirmed 
that decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.") 
C. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond by Determining that Justice Did Not Require Exoneration of the 
Bond 
At the time of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond in this matter, Idaho Criminal Rule 
46(e)(412 provided that the trial court could set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond "if it 
appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement." I.C.R. 46(e)(4). The decision 
whether to set aside a forfeiture or exonerate a bond pursuant to Rule 46(e)(4) is within the trial 
court's discretion. State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1, 3, 843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); State v. Fry, 128 
Idaho 50, 54, 910 P.2d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Idaho Court of Appeals has articulated: 
"In Idaho, it has long been held that the 'fixing of bail and release from custody are traditionally 
within the discretion of the courts. We believe that these matters are most wisely left to the trial 
judge."' &, 128 Idaho at 53, 910 P.2d at 167 (quoting State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985)). 
A review by this Court of the magistrate's exercise of discretion involves consideration 
of whether the magistrate: "(I) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of this discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) reached [his] decision by an exercise of reason." Shore v. 
Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 2 124, 1126 (2009). The Idaho courts have recognized 
several factors - known as "the F'~J factors" - that the trial court can consider in reaching its 
discretionary determination of whether a bond should be forfeited: 
(1) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2) the surety's 
participation in locating and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs, 
A new version of Rule 46 became effective July I ,  2009. However, the prior version of Rule 46 applies 
to the case at hand, as Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond in 2008. R. 106-21. 
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inconvenience, a i d  prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the violation; (4) 
any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance; 
and (6) any mitigating factors. 
F~J, 128 Idaho at 54, 910 P.2d at 168; see also State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 
651, 655, 167 P.2d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007). However, "the factors are not all-inclusive," 
as "[a] trial court may give weight to other relevant factors." Ouick Release Bail Bonds, 144 
Idaho at 655, 167 P.2d at 792. 
1. The Magistrate Appropriately Exercised His Discretion in Denvine Two Jim's 
Motion to Exonerate Bond 
In the case at hand, the magistrate appropriately exercised his discretion in reaching his 
decision to deny Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond. First, the magistrate "perceived the 
issue as one of discretion." Shore, 146 Idaho at 915, 204 P.3d at 1126. The magistrate 
specifically noted: "In this case, the Court has some discretion. It is not automatic that a bond 
will be forfeited forever. There are certain circumstances where the Court has the ability to set 
aside that bond . . . and exonerate it." Tr. (10/31/08), pg. 7, ins. 5-1 1; see also Tr. (5127/09), pg. 
14, lns. 13-15. 
The magistrate then proceeded to "act[] within the outer boundaries of this discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to [the 
magistrate]," and "reached [his] decision by an exercise of reason." Shore, 146 Idaho at 915, 
204 P.3d at 1126; Tr. (10131108), pgs. 4-10. A review of the transcript of the hearing on Two 
Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond reveals that the magistrate's decision was well-reasoned and 
involved consideration of the factors: the willfulness of the Defendant's violation of bail 
conditions, (Tr. (1013 1/08), pg. 4, in. 19 - pg. 5, In. 21); the surety's participation in locating and 
apprehending the defendant, (& at pg. 4, ins. 7-12); inconvenience suffered by the state as a 
result of the violation, (& at pg. 4, Ins. 13-14); intangible costs, (id. at pg. 7, Ins. 12-17); the 
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public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance in court, (a at pg. 5, Ins. 11-21; pg. 7, In. 
14 - pg. 8, In. 9); and any mitigating factors. Id. at pg. 8, Ins. 10-19; see also Tr. (5127109), pg. 
14, In. 12 - pg. 16, In. 10; &, 128 Idaho at 54, 910 P.2d at 168. Substantial and competent 
evidence supported the magistrate's findings of fact, and the magistrate's conclusions of law 
followed from those findings of fact. m, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 3415745, * I .  
Two Jinn, however, attempts to attack the magistrate's well-reasoned decision with three 
general arguments: ( I )  Two Jinn asserts that the magistrate "applied the incorrect legal 
standard;" (2) Two Jinn argues that "both the magistrate and the district court erroneously 
believed that Two Jinn could request extradition" of the defendant, Aaron Harris, from Oregon; 
and (3) Two Jinn asserts that the magistrate failed to recognize the purpose of bail by finding that 
exoneration of the bond was not warranted. Appellant's Brief, pgs. 6-10. Each of these 
arguments is addressed below. 
2. The Magistrate Applied the Correct Legal Standard 
As noted above, Two Jinn first argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying 
Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond because, according to Two Jinn, the magistrate "applied 
the incorrect legal standard." Appellant's Briec pg. 6. Specifically, Two Jinn argues that the 
magistrate "denied Two Jinn's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed to demonstrate that 
'it would . . . not be just to let the forfeiture stand,"' which Two Jinn asserts was the ''incorrect 
legal standard." Id. at 6-7 (quoting Tr. (1013 112008), pg. 9, ins. 4-5). 
a. Two Jinn Failed to Raise This Issue Below 
This argument first fails because it was not raised before the district court below. 
Appellant's 3123109 Brief; Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply ~ r i e f . ~  "It is well settled that when a second 
' Appellant's 3/23/09 Brief and Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply Brief are exhibits to the record in this appeal. 
See R. 182. -
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appeal is taken, the appellants may not raise issues in the higher court different from those 
presented in the intermediate court." Centers v. Yehezkelv, 109 Idaho 216, 217, 706 P.2d 105, 
106 (Ct. App. 1985). "Generally, 'an issue presented on appeal must have been properly framed 
and preserved in the court below.' It follows that after an intermediate appeal, issues not raised in 
the intermediate court will not be addressed in the higher court." Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12, 
16-17, 855 P.2d 473, 477-78 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Centers, 109 Idaho at 217, 706 P.2d at 
106); see also Cooper v. Bd. of Prof I Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 449,456, 
4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000). Two Jinn did not argue, in its intermediate appeal before the district 
court, that the magistrate had "applied the incorrect legal standard" in reaching his discretionary 
determination. Appellant's 3123109 Brief; Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply Brief. Because this 
particular argument was not "properly framed and preserved in the court below," it should not be 
addressed by this Court. m, 124 Idaho at 16-17, 855 P.2d at 477-78 (quoting Centers, 109 
Idaho at 217, 706 P.2d at 106). 
b. The Magistrate Applied the Correct Standard 
Regardless, however, the magistrate's determination was consistent with applicable legal 
standards. Two Jinn's argunlent is based upon semantics rather than substance: Two Jinn claims 
that the magistrate "denied Two Jim's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed to 
demonstrate that 'it would . . . not be just to let the forfeiture ~tand," '~  as compared to Rule 
The magistrate's actual comments were as follows: 
I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling to return to Oregon [sic] and the 
mere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon creates a legal impossibility such 
that it would be - not be just to let the forfeiture stand. 
Tr. (10/31/08), pg. 9, Ins. 1-5 
And I don't find that because they have placed themselves in that situation, in this particular 
case, that it makes it unjust to . . . not forfeit the bond. 
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46(e)(4)'s language, which provided that the trial court could set aside the forfeiture and 
exonerate the bond 'if it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement."' 
Appellant's Brief, pgs. 6-7 (quoting I.C.R. 46(e)(4)); Tr. (10131108), pg. 9 ins. 4-5.) The 
magistrate's consideration of whether "it would be unjust to allow the bond to remain forfeited" 
is the same as whether "justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement." Tr. (10/31108), pg. 
7, ins. 9-10; I.C.R. 46(e)(4). When considering this issue, the trial court can reach one of two 
conclusions; either: ( I )  justice requires the forfeiture's enforcement; or (2) justice does not 
require the forfeiture's enforcement, which would therefore render enforcement of the forfeiture 
"unjust." The magistrate's consideration of whether allowing the bond to remain forfeited would 
be unjust was the correct legal standard, and the magistrate did not act inconsistently with 
applicable legal standards. 
3. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Consideri~lg Whether Two Jinn 
Demonstrated that it Had Taken Steps to Seek Extradition 
Two Jinn additionally argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying Two 
Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond because, according to Two Jinn, the magistrate "erroneously 
believed that Two Jinn could request extradition." Appellant's Brief, pg. 7. Two Jinn's assertion 
overstates the magistrate's holding, which was as follows: 
I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling to return to Oregon 
[sic] and the mere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon creates 
a legal impossibility such that it would be -not be just to let the forfeiture stand. 
There are ways to secure the attendance in the State of Idaho of somebody who's 
charged with a misdemeanor. There's nothing before me that anybody has ever 
taken any of those steps. You can invoke the extradition powers of the states on a 
misdemeanor, as well. It is very rarely done. But here there's been no efforts by 
anybody that I have seen to try and invoke that process to see if Mr. Harris can be 
brought back through the cooperative efforts of the Governor's Office of the State 
of Idaho and the Governor's Office of the State of Oregon. 
Id. at 10, Ins. 15-18. -
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Tr. (10131108), pg. 9, Ins. 1-1 5 (emphasis added). 
The magistrate never held that Two Jinn itself "could request extradition" from the 
Governor's Office of the State of Oregon. id. Instead, the magistrate merely noted that there 
was no evidence from Two Jinn that either Two Jinn or anybody else had taken any steps to "try 
and invoke the process." at pg. 9, in. 12. Indeed, as discussed at oral argument during the 
intermediate appeal before the district court, there was no evidence that Two Jinn took any 
measures to request that the Prosecutor's Office seek extradition of Mr. ~ a r r i s . '  Tr. 
(5127109), pgs. 9-13. In fact, Two Jinn did not even notify the prosecuting attorney that it had 
discovered Mr. Harris in Oregon; the first time Two Jinn disclosed the information was through 
its filing of its Motion to Exonerate Bond. Id. at pg. 9, Ins. 1-10. Thus, Two Jinn sought 
exoneration of the bond without having even taken prior steps to notify the Prosecutor's Office 
of its knowledge of Mr. Harris's whereabouts. Id. 
Two Jinn has argued that "[tlhe magistrate . . . incorrectly weighed the state's failure to 
seek Mr. I-Iarris's extradition against Two Jinn instead of applying that factor in its favor." 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 10. While the Idaho courts have, indeed, held that a trial court can 
consider the state's interest in extraditing the defendant when reaching its discretionary 
determination regarding the exoneration of a bond, the magistrate's conclusion was within the 
bounds of his discretion. It was not an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to consider the 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-4523(2), the prosecuting attorney can apply to the Governor of Idaho for 
extradition to Idaho of an individual who has violated his bail or probation. If the prosecuting attorney 
has no knowledge that the individual has fled the State of Idaho, however, then clearly such an 
application will not be made. As the State's attorney noted before the district court in this matter: "[Iln 
this case I think that the bonding company, if they did have . . . an extraordinary circumstance in this case, 
that being that the defendant was located in Oregon, a state where they're unable to bring him back, at 
that point finding him there, perhaps it would've been on the bonding company that at that time indicate 
that they'd found him in a place where they couldn't bring him back to Idaho, and at that point then make 
the request for that warrant of extradition . . .." Tr. (5/27109), pg. 9, In. 16 - pg. 10, in. 1. 
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potential mitigating factor of the difficulty of extradition and to reach a well-reasoned rejection 
of that excuse, based in part upon Two Jinn's lack of any efforts to try to invoke the extradition 
process through the means available to Two Jinn, such as timely notification of the prosecutor 
andlor requesting that the prosecutor apply to the Governor for extradition. Tr. (1013 1/08), 
pg. 9, Ins. 1-15; Tr. (5/27/09), pgs. 9-13. 
In addition to its consideration of Two Jinn's lack of action in requesting extradition, the 
Court also considered Two Jinn's assumption of risks and obligation to secure the defendant's 
presence in court. As discussed in more detail below, this appropriate focus on the surely's risks 
and obligations further supported the magistrate's conclusion that justice did not require 
exoneration of the bond, despite Mr. Harris's presence in Oregon 
4. The Mapistrate Appropriately Considered the Underlying Purpose of 
Bail Bonds 
Two Jinn's final argument with respect to the magistrate's alleged abuse of discretion in 
determining that justice did not require exoneration of the bond is that the magistrate "failed to 
recognize the policies underlying relief from forfeiture, including fulfilling bail's purpose by 
providing the surety a financial incentive to locate absconding defendants." Appellant's Brief, 
pg. 10. The State disagrees that the purpose of a bail bond is to provide a surety with a financial 
incentive to locate a fugitive. Taking a photograph of the fugitive in another state does not 
effectuate the purpose of securing the defendant's presence in court. To the extent that the bail 
bond is intended to provide an incentive for any behavior on the part of the surety, it is instead 
intended to encourage the surety to return the defendant himself to court. Two Jinn predicts that 
if the Court rules against it in this case, "bail agents such as Two Jinn will no longer undertake 
the expense to find defendants who have fled Idaho - particularly those who have fled to 
neighboring Oregon . . .." Appellant's Brief, pg. 10. In other words, Two Jinn will not longer 
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locate a defendant, fail to inform the prosecution or any entity that can actually extradite the 
defendant, and then demand that the trial court exonerate the bond for its extraordinary efforts in 
having failed to accomplish the primary purpose of the bond: to return the defendant to court 
Two Jinn suggests that the magistrate failed to focus on the appropriate policy reasons 
andlor purposes underlying bail bonds. To the contrary, the magistrate appropriately considered 
the primary purpose of bail bonds, which Two Jinn itself recognized: "to effectuate the accused's 
appearance in court," and appropriately focused on Two Jim's assunption of risks and 
obligations under the bond contract. Id. at 8 (citing to Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 
The magistrate reasoned: 
Here, however, what I find is that the bonding company took a risk. They're in 
the business of posting surety bonds to ensure that people appear at future court 
appearances. 
I have no evidence of what efforts, if any, the bonding company may have done 
or taken to secure or to ensure that their client was not going to fly the coop. Was 
going to cooperate as far as appearing at all of their court appearances. 
That is exactly why we have a surety bond arrangement. And so that there is 
some guarantee that a person is going to appear at all of their court appearances. 
That is the exact obligation that the bonding company assumes when they post a 
surety bond for a criminal defendant. 
Obviously, no bonding company isFgoing to assume the total responsibility for 
supervising the client 24 hours a day, seven days a week to make sure that they 
don't do anything silly. But they do have an obligation to bring that person to the 
court. And the bonding company failed in that obligation. 
They now claim that it's impossible because they may face criminal prosecution 
in another state. And while that may occur, that, too, is a risk that the bonding 
company takes when they bond somebody out and they're going to do business in 
this particular geographical region. If somebody is going to flee the area, whether 
it is to Oregon, or Alaska, or Northern Ireland, or wherever[,] a person may 
decide that they don't [want] to come back. In which case there are some 
practical difficulties and some legal difficulties. 
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But that is not tlie responsibility or obligation of the State of Idaho or of the 
Public Defender appointed to represent Mr. Harris. That is the commercial 
responsibility of the surety bond company. 
Tr. (10/31108), pg. 7, In. 14 - pg. 8, in. 23. 
While the exact issue presented in this case does not appear to have been previously 
examined by the Idaho courts, the magistrate's reasoning was in accordance with many other 
jurisdictions that have addressed similar scenarios. In fact, the United States Supreine Court has 
long held that a surety should not be automatically relieved of its obligations simply because the 
defendant flees tlie jurisdiction: 
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his 
sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever 
they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; 
and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done. 
They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into 
another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and 
enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. 
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner. 
In 6 Modem it is said: 'The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the 
string whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' . . . They may 
doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits of the State within which he is 
to answer, but it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if any evil ensue, they 
must bear the burden of the consequences, and cannot cast them upon the 
obligee. 
In the case of Devine v. The State, the court, speaking of the principal, say, 'The 
sureties had the control of his person; they were bound at  their peril to keep 
him within their jurisdiction, and to have his person ready to surrender 
when demanded. . . . In the case before us, the failure of the sureties to 
surrender their principal, was, in the view of the taw, the result of their own 
negligence or connivance, in suffering their principal to go beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court and from under their control.' 
Tavlor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872) (emphasis added). 
A bail bond is a three-party contract between the state, the accused, and the 
surety, whereby the surety guarantees appearance of the accused. The risk of a 
defendant not appearing is borne by the surety and the surety, in order to protect 
its interest, must take precautionary actions to prevent this type of situation. . . . 
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apprehend and produce appellant for trial as the bond obligated it to do were 
immaterial to the matter of forfeiting the bond and the rendition of a judgment 
against the surety for the penalty of it. 
State v. Honey, 86 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (Neb.1957) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, another court held: 
She contends that her principal was prevented from making his appearance in the 
Court below by reason of the failure of North Carolina, the obligee, to assert 
its right to his custody. The position is untenable. Upon the execution of the 
bail bond, William Dudley Pelley was delivered into the custody of his sureties. 
The very purpose of the bond was not to enrich the treasury of Buncombe 
County, but to make the sureties responsible for the appearance of the 
defendant at  the proper time. In the case of United States v. Marrin, supra, the 
defendant was released on a bail bond for his appearance in the District Court of 
the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. While Marrin was out 
on bond he went to New York, where he was arrested, convicted upon charges of 
forgery and grand larceny and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen 
years in Sing Sing. The surety on the bail bond in Pennsylvania raised the same 
question as to the duty of the United States Court to have requested the custody of 
the principal. The Court said: "Though the United States attorney was present at 
the hearing, his failure to request Manin's release was no such act of the obligee 
as to relieve the surety, because non constat that the request would have been 
granted by the court. It was Marrin's own act in going into that jurisdiction that 
rendered his appearance impossible. Our  attention has not been called to any 
case holding that under any circumstances the prosecuting attorney of a 
district in which the recognizance runs is required to make an effort to 
secure the removal or  release of an alleged criminal arrested in another 
jurisdiction. He may do so, but he is not required to act. The recognizance is 
taken to secure that very result. Its condition is absolute in this regard, and, in our 
judgment, it would be a very dangerous innovation to require the government 
to not only see to it that responsible bail is secured, but, in addition, require 
it to keep its prosecuting officers in readiness to appear in other and distant 
jurisdictions to aid the principal in the recognizance to extricate himself from 
an arrest from which alone the latter is to blame." 
State V. Pellev, 24 S.E.2d 635, 638 (N.C. 1943) (quoting United States v. Marrin, 170 F. 476 
(E.D. Pa. 1909)); see also County of Los Angeies v. Ranger Ins. Co., 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 28 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996) ("Cuba was just one of many places which defendant could flee to and be 
immune from surety's agents. Such risks were present when surety posted bond. Respondent did 
not act to increase those risks.") 
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Two J i m  further suggests that the magistrate abused his discretion in focusing on the 
risks assumed by Two Jinn under the bond agreement, as the magistrate concluded that justice 
did not require forfeiture of the bond on the mere basis that "the bonding company hadn't 
secured enough collateral, or co-signers, or any other security regarding the obligations," noting: 
"[Tlhat's the bond company's responsibility. That's their obligation," and "if the bonding 
company malces the decision that they have not adequately secured the bond, that's their risk." 
Tr. (10131/08), pg. 10, ins. 7-14. This conclusion on the part of the magistrate was well within 
the bounds of his discretion. The magistrate focused on the very terms of the contract to which 
Two Jinn contractually agreed; to suggest that it was an abuse of discretion for him to do so is 
untenable. Indeed, other courts have come to the same appropriate conclusion as the magistrate 
in this case: 
The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a bail surety. It is precisely 
the situation which a surety guarantees against. Appellant insured the risk by 
securing property of the defendant. The fact that appellant is now unable to 
deliver the defendant or fully collect on his collateral will not shift the risk to 
the obligee. We hold, therefore, that it is an insufficient defense in a bond 
forfeiture proceeding that appellant is unable to produce the defendant due 
to foreign policy decisions when the defendant voluntarily fled the country 
prior to his initial court appearance date. 
State v. Obayon, 467 N.E.2d 908,911-12 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). 
"Sureties know and solemnly contract that the defendant shall appear and abide 
the orders of the court and in the event of his default are bound by their 
obligation. . . . If sureties, who have it in their power to insure compliance by 
a defendant, may he relieved because they make diligent effort for his arrest 
as a fugitive there exists little inducement for diligence on their part in the 
first instance to prevent his escape. To exonerate sureties for such reason 
would seriously impede the declared public policy of the State for the 
prevention and punishment of crime. . . ." 
Otller reasons for denying relief to the surety are these: . . . the removal of the 
principal to Oklahoma and his falling into the toils of the law of that state are the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 14 
Surety's inability to perform its obligation is due to its own fault in permitting 
the defendant to leave the State. . .. 
Alleghenv Cas. Co. v. State, 850 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Two Jinn's suggestion that the magistrate's decision ignores the underlying purpose of 
bail bands because the "refus[al] to exonerate the bond in these circumstances rewards the state's 
lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris with a windfall of the forfeiture funds in its treasury" is 
untenable. Appellant's Brief, pg. 8. First, as discussed previously, there is no indication in the 
record that the state displayed a "lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris," as Two Jinn never 
requested that the state pursue extradition, and as the state was not even aware of Mr. I-Iarris's 
presence in Oregon until after Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate. &e id.; Tr. (5/27/09), 
pgs. 9-13. Regardless, however, it was not an abuse of the magistrate's discretion for him to 
focus on Two Jinn's contractual obligations and assumed risks with respect to the bail bond, 
rather than shifting his focus to the alleged actions of a third party 
As a Nebraska court articulated in a similar situation: 
It was not important that Nebraska officers did not assist the surety in its 
attempt to secure the return of appellant. They had no duty to do so. Their 
refusal was not an interference with or an obstacle to the performance of the 
obligation of the surety as provided in the bond. 
. . . It is stated in United States v. Marrin, D.C., 170 F. 476-478: 'It is contended 
his failure to appear resulted from the failure of the United States district attorney 
to urge Judge Chatfield to release him. Upon entering into the recognizance 
Marrin was delivered into the custody of his surety, who was thereafter 
responsible for his appearance. Upon this contract the government had a right 
to rely, and it is not required to go out of the jurisdiction in which the 
recognizance was given to help the cognizor to extricate himself from a 
situation in which he of his own motion became entangled.' 
The responsibility to have appellant in court when his presence was required 
was solely that of the surety. The essence of the complaint of the surety is that 
the officers did not do or assist in doing what the bond required of the surety. 
There is no showing that the officers or the State did anything to interfere with 
performance by the surety. The facts in reference to the efforts of the surety to 
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result of defendant's own voluntary act; the surety is at fault for permitting 
him to go into another jurisdiction, instead of keeping him under its control 
State v. Harmnond, 426 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Mo. 1968) (quoting State v. Hinoiosa, 271 S.W.2d 522, 
524 (Mo 1954)); see also ~ m a t i l l a ~ o u n t v  v. Resolute Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 731, 733 (Or. Ct. App. 
1972) ("The state is not the surety's surety. We have not been cited to any provision . . . that 
says that the surety shall not be answerable on its bond unless the state takes some positive 
action to insure that the surety's principals will meet their unqualified obligation to appear at the 
appointed time.") 
Two Jinn additionally argues that "public policy disfavors forfeitures." Appellant's 
Brief, pg. 4. The Idaho law cited by Two Jinn on this point holds only that a magistrate's 
decision not to forfeit a bond was within his discretion and "consistent with the policy 
disfavoring forfeitures." State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 117-18, 952 P.2d 
1249, 1253-54 (Ct. App. 1998). Equally (if not more) compelling is the public policy 
disfavoring a defendant's failure to appear in court, which is the primary purpose underlying a 
bail bond contract, as well as the public policy favoring the enforcement of contractual 
obligations, such as Two Jinn's contractual obligation to effectuate the defendant's appearance in 
court. See, ex.,  Burlev Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist Pub. Co., 90 Idaho 515, 414 P.2d 460, 462-63 
(1966) ("It would be both inequitable and against public policy of this state to permit one party 
to a contract, voluntarily made, to seek relief from an executed contract after receiving the 
benefits thereunder and not permit the other party similarly to enforce the contractual 
obligations."); Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952) ("An 
agreement voluntarily made between competent persons is not lightly to be set aside on the 
grounds of public policy, or because it turned out unfortunately for one party."); Marshall v. 
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Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 205, 359 P.2d 504, 507 (1959) ("We do not so far forget that the usual 
and most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts than 
to enable parties thereto to escape their obligation on the pretext of public policy . . ..") (quoting 
Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 1 1 (Mim. 1924)) 
In sum, as one court aptly articulated: "The purpose of a hail bond is to have the 
principal appear at a prescribed time. The fact that his presence may subsequently be 
obtained through extradition cannot eliminate the prejudice to the state which must he presumed 
as a result of the delay in bringing him to trial. Since the surety failed to perform its obligation, 
it must be held liable upon its undertaking." Pinellas Countv v. Robertson, 490 So.2d 1041, 
1043 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added). The magistrate appropriately considered the 
underlying purpose of bail bonds and reached a well-reasoned decision well within the bounds of 
his discretion. 
D. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond by Concluding that the Doctrine of Impossibility Did Not Require 
Exoneration 
Two Jinn additionally argues that "because Oregon law and the state's lack of interest in 
prosecuting Mr. Hanis made it impossible for Two Jinn to bring him before the court, the 
doctrine of impossibility should excuse Two Jinn's performance under the bail bond agreement." 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 1 1. 
As this Court has stated: "[Tlhe doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance 
when the bargained-for perfonnance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being 
performed due to the unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." I-Iaessly v. Safeco Title Ins. 
Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463,465,825 P. 2d 1 119, 1 121 (1992). 
Impossibility is proven by showing that a contingency occurred, the 
nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the agreement, and that the 
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contingency made performance of the contract impossible. It is not sufficient to 
show that the performance simply became more difficult or Inore expensive than 
anticipated-it inust have been made impossible. Most iniportantly, it is the task 
itself which must be impossible-it is not enough that the particular promisor is 
unable to perform the task if it would be possible for a different promisor to 
perform. 
State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Two Jinn's attempt to rely upon the doctrine of impossibility fails on several fronts. 
First, the contingency of Mr. Harris fleeing the jurisdiction cannot be deemed an "unforeseen, 
supervening act;" nor has Two Jinn demonstrated that Mr. Harris's continued presence in Idaho 
"was a basic assumption of the [bond] agreement." m, 121 Idaho at 465, 825 P. 2d at 1121 
(emphasis added); Chacon, 146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752. There is no evidence on the 
record that Two Jinn's obligations to ensure Mr. Harris's appearance in court were only valid so 
long as Mr. Harris remained in Idaho. Likewise, a criminal defendant's decision to flee to 
another state or country is hardly an "unforeseeable" event, but is instead exactly the type of risk 
that a bonding company assumes and insures against to guarantee the defendant's appearance in 
court. See Ohavon, 467 N.E.2d at 91 1 ("The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a bail 
surety.") In the case at hand, Mr. Harris had a history of disappearing, as he failed to appear for 
at least four court appearances and for a sheriffs work program. R. 2, 4-5, 44, 77-78, 95-96, 
103-04. His act of leaving the jurisdiction was not "unforeseeable." 
To the extent Two J im is arguing that "an essential component of its performance is the 
state's continued desire to prosecute the defendant," Two J im similarly cannot demonstrate that 
this "was a basic assumption of the [bond] agreement." Appellant's Brief, pg. 13; Chacon, 146 
Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752. "[IJt would be a very dangerous innovation to require the 
government to not only see to it that responsible bail is secured, but, in addition, require it to 
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keep its prosecuting officers in readiness to appear in other and distant jurisdictions to aid the 
principal in the recognizance to extricate himself from [circumstances] from which alone the 
latter is to blame." w, 24 S.E.2d at 638. Two Jinn cannot demonstrate that its obligations 
under the bond agreement were only enforceable so long as the state unequivocally continued to 
seek prosecution of the defendant, regardless of the circumstances. Regardless, there is no 
evidence in the record that the state was suddenly not interested in sentencing Mr. Harris on his 
parole violation; if Mr. Harris were to appear in court, as Two Jinn was required to ensure, the 
state would undoubtedly be very interested in continuing its prosecution of the defendant. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond before the 
state was even made aware of the fact that Mr. Harris had left Idaho, which undermines its 
argument that the state somehow failed to pursue extradition within the 180 day period following 
forfeiture of the bond.6 Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. 
Another reason why Two Jinn's impossibility defense fails is the fact that the obligation 
at issue - securing Mr. Harris's appearance in court - is not impossible for anyone to perform. 
"[l]t is the task itself which must be impossible - it is not enough that the particular pro~nisor 
[Two Jinn] is unable to perform the task if it would be possible for a different promisor to 
perform." m, 146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (emphasis added). Two Jinn recognizes 
this requirement of the doctrine of impossibility, but argues that "[alny bail agent would be 
Two Jinn argues that "Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) directs the court to exonerate the bond if the 
defendant is brought before the cou~t within 180 days following forfeiture. . . . The state had not requested 
an extraditable warrant that would have permitted Oregon law enforcement to arrest Mr. Narris at Two 
Jinn's request." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. Forfeiture of the bond occurred on February 5,2008. R. 104- 
05. The state did not become aware of the fact that Mr. Harris had moved to The Dalles, Oregon until 
Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond on August I, 2008. Tr. (5127109), pg. 9; Appellant's Brief, 
pg. 8. Not surprisingly, given its lack of knowledge that Mr. Narris had left Idaho, the state "had not 
requested an extraditable warrant" prior to August 1, 2008. Notably, this was only three days before the 
expiration of the 180-day period following forfeiture, which would not have allowed sufficient time for 
extradition within that time period, anyway. R. 104-05. 
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similarly unable to perform and, thus, the impossibility was not personal to Two Jinn." 
Appellant's Brief., pgs. 12-13. The standard is not whether another bail agent would be able to 
perform the task, but whether "it would be possible for a different promisor to perform." Chacon, 
146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (holding that "[Chacon] does not suggest that it was 
impossible for anyone to [perform the obligation under the contract]. Therefore, the doctrine of 
impossibility does not operate to excuse Chacon's nonperformance.") (emphasis added). The 
task itself - securing Mr. Harris's appearance in court in Idaho - is not in and of itself impossible 
for anyone to perform. 
Two Jinn's argument of impossibility is further undermined because Two Jinn failed to 
demonstrate that it had taken any steps to request that the prosecuting attorney apply for 
extradition. See Tr. (5/27/09), pgs. 9-13. "It is not sufficient to show that the performance 
simply became more difficult or more expensive than anticipated," such as having to take 
measures to request extradition; "it must have been made impossible." Chacon, 146 Idaho at 
523, 198 P.3d at 752 (emphasis added). 
Finally, Two Jinn's argument fails because the circumstances at issue were created by the 
voluntary actions of the defendant, Mr. Harris, in fleeing the state, as well as Two Jinn's own 
actions in failing to prevent Mr. I-Iarris from leaving the jurisdiction. Curlycan Bail Bonds, 
Inc. v. State, 933 So.2d 122, 123 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the bonding company's 
impossibility defense and holding: "Here, it was also a combination of Fonseca's voluntary 
action in fleeing to Venezuela and Curlycan's failure to take precautionary action to prevent his 
leaving the jurisdiction which led to the surety's inability to perform its obligation under the 
bond. Curlycan is therefore not entitled to be relieved of the monetary obligation it contractually 
assumed.") The United States Supreme Court has loilg held that the defense of impossibility is 
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not available when the surety's obligation is rendered impossihle by the acts of the surety or the 
defendantiprincipal. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 370. "The principal in the case before us, cannot be 
allowed to avail himself of an impossibility of performance thus created; and what will not avail 
him cannot avail his sureties. His contract is identical with theirs. They undertook for him what 
he undertook for himself." Id. at 374. 
Even in situations where the "impossihility" of extraditing the defendant is more 
pronounced, courts in various jurisdictions have rejected the argument that performance under a 
bail bond agreement should he excused by the doctrine of impossihility. In Professional Bail 
Bonds. Inc. v. State, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed a situation where the 
defendant had voluntarily fled to I-Ionduras, which lacked an extradition treaty with the United 
States. The court nevertheless rejected tlie impossihility defense, holding: 
We reject appellant's contention that the circuit court should have stricken 
forfeiture of the bonds because it was impossihle to produce tlie defendants. The 
purpose of a bail bond system is to insure that the party accused is present at 
trial. Judge Wenner expounded upon the inefficacy of an argument based on 
impossibility under circumstances wherein the surety has expressly assumed just 
such a risk. We note that in the typical contract case, the promisor may not rely 
on the defense of "impossihility" as an excuse for non-performance if the 
promisor assumed the risk. 
. . . . The defendants voluntarily fled the country. Appellant insured against 
that flight, and must now suffer the consequence. . . . 
The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a hail surety. It is precisely 
the situation which a surety guarantees against. . . . 
. . . In the instant case, . . . [tlhe Defendant voluntarily fled the country and did not 
appear in Court as required. For diplomatic reasons, i.e., lack of an extradition 
treaty with Honduras, the Defendant cannot be returned to the United States. . . . 
This Court finds that . . . the Petitioner in this case "assumed the risk" that the 
Defendant would not appear at trial. Petitioner's good faith attempts to locate the 
Defendant are no defense to Petitioner's failure to appear. It is an insufficient 
defense that Petitioner is unable to produce the defendant due to the lack of 
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an extradition treaty with Honduras when the defendant voluntarily fled the 
country prior to his initial court appearance date. 
Professional Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 968 A.2d 1136, 1147-49 (Md. Ct. App. 2009) (some 
emphasis added) (some emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
also State v. Phayon, 467 N.E.2d 908 (Ohio 1983) (rejecting the surety's petition to have the -
bond forfeiture stricken despite the fact that the defendant had absconded to Israel and refused to 
return to Ohio and the fact that the United Stales declined to press Israel for extradition.) 
The Florida Court of Appeals rejected the defense of impossibility where a defendant fled 
to Georgia and was shot and killed by a law enforcement officer. State v. Sunshine State Bail 
Bonds, Inc., 967 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007). Despite the defendant's death, the court 
ordered that the bond forfeiture remain in place, holding that "the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance does not excuse Sunshine State Bail Bonds of its obligation to take precautionary 
action to prevent Vilpre from leaving the jurisdiction, even though the actions of a third party 
prevented it from bringing Vilpre back to the jurisdiction." & at 1085, 
Many jurisdictions have also held that where a surety cannot secure a defendant's 
presence in court because the defendant has been incarcerated in another state, the surety 
nevertheless cannot rely upon the doctrine of impossibility, as the Idaho courts have recognized: 
The first line of authority, that incarceration i n  another jurisdiction does not 
provide a valid excuse to avoid bond forfeiture, began with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 US. 366, 21 L.Ed 287 (1872). 
In Taylor, the Court ruled, "It is the willing act of the [the defendant] which 
creates the obstacle, and the legal effect is the same as of any other act of his, 
which puts performance out of his power." Id. at 370, 21 L.Ed 287. Thus, a 
surety had no claim for avoiding the forfeiture of bond because "what will not 
avail [the defendant] cannot avail his sureties." Id. at 374, 21 L.Ed. 287. More 
recent cases have followed this line of reasoning. In State v. Fields, 137 
N.J.Super. 76, 347 A.2d 810 (Ct.App.Div.1975), the New Jersey court stated that 
the "mere fact that defendant is imprisoned in Florida is not sufficient to relieve 
the forfeiture in whole or in part, especially if he left New Jersey without 
permission, or is jailed for a new crime." Id., 347 A.2d at 81 1. Likewise, an 
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Alabama appellate court has held, "The rule is well established that the 
incarceration in another state of the principal in a bail bond arrangement made in 
this state does not relieve the sureties on that bond of their obligation to produce 
the principal at the appointed place and time in Alabama." Johnson v. State, 401 
So.2d '1 18, 1 18-1 9 (Ala.Civ.App. 198 1). 
&y, 128 Idaho at 52, 910 P.2d at 166. In &y, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that incarceration 
in another state does not automatically lead to exoneration of a bond, but is instead a factor to be 
considered by the trial court in reaching its discretionary decision whether exoneration is 
warranted. Id. It logically follows that if something as extreme as incarceration in another state 
does not lead to automatic exoneration of the bond, then mere voluntary refusal to return from 
another state and difficulty with extradition similarly do not lead to automatic exoneration on the 
basis of "impossibility." 
The magistrate was well within the bounds of his discretion in concluding that the 
doctrine of impossibility did not warrant exoneration of the bond under these circumstances 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate appropriately exercised his discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Bond. Substantial and competent evidence in the record supported the magistrate's 
findings of fact, and his conclusions of law followed from those findings. Crump, P.3d -, 
2009 WL 3415745, *I .  Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
district court's affirmation of the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond. 
See id. --
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 2009. 
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